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APPRAISING THE NONEXISTENT: THE DELAWARE COURTS'
STRUGGLE WITH CONTROL PREMIUMS
WILLIAMJ. CARNEYt & MARK HEIMENDINGERtt
The Delaware Supreme Court has concluded that under the Delaware ap-
praisal statute, dissenting shareholders are entitled to the pro rata value of their
firm and that the market price of any firm's stock reflects an implicit minority dis-
count from its pro rata value. Thus, to ensure that dissenting shareholders are
properly compensated, the Delaware courts have been adding a "control premium"
to firm values. As we will demonstrate, this doctrine has resulted in inflated
awards to dissenting shareholders, for if the conclusion of the Delaware Supreme
Court that market prices do not include a control premium is correct, it does not
follow that dissenting shareholders must be paid a premium, and if the conclusion
is incorrect, then the theoretical support for paying a premium disappears.
INTRODUCTION
Appraisal proceedings have hardly been the Delaware courts' fin-
est moments. For decades, these courts eschewed evidence based on
widely accepted finance methodology, holding instead that determi-
nations of value were questions of law and not fact.1 It was not until
1983 that the Delaware Supreme Court permitted the introduction of
evidence obtained through modem valuation methods. While the
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See, e.g., Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 348
(Del. Ch. 1973) ("It is established Delaware law that for appraisal purposes earnings
are to be determined by averaging the corporation's earnings over a reasonable period
of time."), aff'd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975). For a criticism of the former "Delaware
Block" methodology, see David Cohen, Comment, Valuation in the Context of Share Ap-
praisal 34 EMORYL.J. 117 (1985), which concludes "that the Delaware block method is
inconsistent with modem valuation theory and that, in general, the stock market price
supplies the most essential ingredient in an enlightened approach to share appraisal."
Id. at 119.
2 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983) (declaring the
"Delaware Block" or weighted average method to be "clearly outmoded" and stating
that subsequent appraisals "must include proof of value by any techniques or methods
which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community").
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current methodology is generally market-based, the courts neverthe-
less continue to speak of value in ways that show a deep misunder-
standing of valuation methodology and a distrust of market values.
Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court has stated that the market price
of shares may not be representative of true value . In Smith v. Van
5Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court criticized a board that relied on
a 46% premium over the market because it was uninformed about "in-
trinsic value."6 More recently, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected
an appraised valuation that was 200% above the pre-transaction
market value on the basis that the "trial court's decision to reject the
addition of a control premium... placed too much emphasis on
market value."7 The court criticized the chancery court's valuation as
too low because it failed to add a control premium to the market price
of comparable companies to reach the asserted value of the whole
firm, choosing instead to use the "discounted" market price of a small
block of shares in the trading market." The pre-announcement mar-
ket price was $17.25; 9 the consideration paid in the cash-out merger
was worth approximately $28;' ° the appraised value initially deter-
mined by the chancery court was $51;1" and the final value awarded
3 While the market value of a company's stock does not necessarily accurately es-
timate that company's future cash flows, the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis
(ECMH) demonstrates that a certain deference needs to be given to market value. See
RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 369-70
(6th ed. 2000) (cautioning management to pay attention to market values in a sub-
chapter entitled "The Six Lessons of Market Efficiency"). We urge courts to heed this
advice.
4 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12
(Del. 1989) ("[I] t is not a breach of faith for directors to determine that the present
stock market price of shares is not representative of true value or that there may in-
deed be several market values for any corporation's stock."). Whether or not this
statement is true, the court fails to suggest any of the reasons for this shortcoming,
such as the existence of material nonpublic information. See Daniel R. Fischel, Market
Evidence in Corporate Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 941, 941 (2002) (arguing "that courts
should rely more heavily on market prices when resolving valuation disputes").
5 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
6 Id. at 874-76. This misguided search for the holy grail of intrinsic value began
with Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950), which defined the "value of
stockholders proportionate interest" as "the true or intrinsic value of his stock." Id. at
72.
7 Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 1992).
8 Id. at 804-05.
9 Harris v. Rapid-Am. Corp., No. 6462, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 1, 1992).
10 Harris v. Rapid-Am. Corp., No. 6462, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 166, at *3 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 2, 1990).
11 Id. at *52.
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after remand, including the control premium, was $73.29.12 If a
shareholder purchased shares immediately before the announcement,
the gain was 325%. This bizarre result has received relatively little at-
tention, except to the extent that it has become an accepted part of
Delaware law. While the Delaware courts appear to believe they are
using the science of financial economics in their valuation efforts,
their misunderstandings have led to windfalls for dissenting share-
holders.
George Stigler once said that one should have a license to practice
economics; 14 Fred McChesney repeated that caution with respect to
law professors attempting to practice it; 5 and yet, courts are forced by
necessity to engage in economic valuation." This reality necessitates
that those who criticize must provide constructive criticism.
Received wisdom in Delaware corporate law now seems to under-
stand that stock market prices are inaccurate in a way that cannot be
tested empirically. 17 This wisdom holds that in nearly all cases the
12 Harris, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *13.
13 But see Richard A. Booth, Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Pro-
ceedings, 57 BUS. LAW. 127, 128 (2001) (arguing "that the addition of a control pre-
mium is inconsistent with settled corporation law and good policy that there is no basis
for the assumption that market prices routinely build in a minority discount").
14 George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC.,
Spring 1971, at 3, 18.
15 See Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field: A Cri-
tique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1530, 1547-48 (1989) (emphasizing that, while
"economists cannot practice law," corporate law scholars can enter the field of eco-
nomics "without training or examination" and noting that "[a] Ithough a few corporate
lawyers make good economists, most do not" (citing George J. Stigler, Occupational Li-
censure for Economists ?, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION 348 (Simon Rot-
tenberg ed., 1980))).
16 The Delaware courts, in considering expert testimony in this area, are bound by
Delaware's version of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. DEL. R. EVID. 702. Delaware has
followed the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings in this area, that a trial judge must "'en-
sure that any and all scientific testimony... is not only relevant, but reliable."' M.G.
Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 521 (Del. 1999) (quoting Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). In this sense, Delaware courts
are inevitably drawn into difficult judgments of scientific expertise.
17 Studies of control purchases provide ample evidence that control premiums ex-
ist. For examples, see Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 597 (1989); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some
Consequences in the Law of Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 881 (2003); Mi-
chael Jensen & Richard Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,
I IJ. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983). But the point is that while the value of a company may re-
flect the expected value of a known potential transaction, control premiums do not
simply inhere in the value of all companies. A value-creating control transaction is
simply too low a probability event for most firms.
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market value of stock in any publicly traded company is merely the
value of a minority interest which necessarily reflects a minority dis-
count.' This reasoning denies that the value of an entire company is
simply the market value of its equity plus the market value of its debt.
The Delaware courts have accepted this wisdom and have rejected the
"aggregate market value" approach to valuing shares of a company in
an appraisal proceeding. Under Delaware's current approach, the
value of the company as a going concern must include that element of
value known as the control premium.' 9 This approach poses a funda-
mental challenge to the "law of one price, 20 which asserts that arbi-
trage will tend to trade away any difference between price and eco-
21nomic value.
We argue that both the received wisdom and the Delaware ap-
proach contain fundamental misconceptions about value. In addi-
tion, the Delaware approach creates conflicts in the way minority
shareholders are treated in various forced-sale situations (e.g., stock-
for-stock mergers and at least some reverse stock splits) that can only
be reconciled by rejecting the notion that control premiums inhere in
the values of all companies.
Part I is the doctrinal section of this Article. It reviews the Dela-
ware cases that have adopted a "control premium" approach to valua-
tion. We argue that these decisions have misread earlier precedents
that required a firm to be valued as a going concern-with all its
warts-rather than at a higher liquidation value that would have
eliminated agency costs or at a post-transaction value that would have
assumed potential synergies from a hypothetical (and thus specula-
tive) business combination.
18 See, e.g., Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 1992) (stating that
the "exclusion of a 'control premium' artificially and unrealistically treated Rapid as a
minority shareholder"); Le Beau v. M.G. Bancorporation, No. 13414, 1998 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 9, at *25 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1998) (determining that an expert witness's capital
market valuation approach included a "built-in minority discount"). Interestingly, this
same wisdom does not apply to the market value of debt so that, in determining a
company's equity value, a court is free to subtract only the market value of debt from
the value of the firm even if such debt is trading at a discount. Rapid-Am., 603 A.2d at
804.
19 Infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
20 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 3, at 796 n.8 (defining the "law of one price" as
the gurchasing power parity principle applied to the price of a single good).
Id. at 38 & n.3. This also poses a challenge-correct or not-to the general ac-
ceptance by much of the academic literature of ECMH, which according to some is
one of the most well established hypotheses in all the social sciences. See, e.g., Michael
Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, 4 MIDLAND CoRP. FIN. J., Sum-
mer 1986, at 6, 11.
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Part II reviews the literature that argues for the addition of a con-
trol premium to the stock price of every publicly traded company. We
demonstrate that the basis for this argument is not supported by the
presently available evidence. Control premiums are only paid when a
bidder perceives that a purchase of control is worthwhile-where
there are gains from trade. Moreover, despite the claims of the Dela-
ware courts and some commentators, there are not multiple and sepa-
rate markets for shares of firms (e.g., trading markets for small blocks
and a separate market for corporate control). We expressly exclude
consideration of a control premium in second stage takeout mergers,
where a control premium has already been paid. We should empha-
size that our enterprise is quite limited: we only address the imputa-
tion of a control premium in freeze-out mergers where there is no re-
lated control transaction.
Part III relaxes the assumption of efficient capital markets and re-
views the fairness arguments that revolve around the disparate treat-
ment of shareholders. We explain that these arguments are rejected
either by evidence of ex ante payments or the widespread availability
of contractual arrangements to allocate the receipt of control premi-
ums. Accordingly, if public investors discount the price they pay for
shares to reflect their lack of control over firm policies and agency
costs, then compensating them on the basis of the same "minority dis-
count" is not unfair. In other words, shareholders who receive the
market value of their shares either through appraisal or selling into
the market, generally, get what they paid for.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the structure and language of Delaware's
appraisal statute to show that it contemplates paying minority share-
holders for what they owned, and that this provides them with full
compensation. Here, we show that where market exceptions to ap-
praisal are present, shareholders will always receive as "fair value" the
market price with its claimed "minority discount," rather than receive
a control premium. To pay more when appraisal is available not only
provides those shareholders with a windfall at the expense of the ma-
jority, but also creates a conflict in Delaware corporate law. The
Delaware Supreme Court's approval of market value as fair value in a
recent reverse stock split that eliminated small shareholders highlights
the conflict with its use of control premiums in other areas.
Ultimately, we urge courts to presume that market value is the
best measure of fair value. The burden should then be placed on dis-
senting shareholders to prove why and to what extent market value is
20031
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inadequate. We believe this would improve the accuracy of appraisal
valuations and at the same time achieve judicial economies.
I. DELAWARE'S TREATMENT OF CONTROL PREMIUMS
We begin by tracing how the Delaware courts first rejected the no-
tion of any premium over "going concern value" that might result
from a sale or liquidation and then used that same going concern
doctrine to conclude that a share was always worth less than its pro
rata share of the value of the going concern. The logic of the "going
concern" doctrine simply cannot bear this burden. Nonetheless,
while denying that any speculative elements of value should be em-
ployed, the courts have reached the point where a control premium
has become an integral part of the value of every going concern, re-
gardless of how speculative such a control premium might be.
A. Rejection of Market Values
Delaware's current control premium confusion began with Chicago
Corp. v. Munds, the first Delaware Chancery Court decision to analyze
the definition of "value., 23 While the court concluded, when speaking
of the dissenting shareholder, that " [w] hat he is deprived of is what he
should be paid for,,24 the court's analysis of why market value is not a
sufficient arbiter of "value" created a precedent that survives to this
day.
The court based its decision primarily on two arguments: (i) al-
though the version of the Delaware statute in effect at the time of the
decision was modeled on a New Jersey statute, it rejected the term
"market value" as used in the New Jersey statute and instead used the
term "value,, 25 and (ii) market value was not an adequate determinant
of value because a merger would "destroy [a company's] individual
identity and wipe[] out of existence all the stock of [its] kind," thus
rendering impossible any replacement in the market.2
6
22 172 A. 452 (Del. Ch. 1934).
23 Id. at 453-57. Note that at this time the statute simply used the term "value"
rather than "fair value." Id. at 453 (quoting DEL. REv. CODE, § 1975 (1915), amended by
35 Del. Laws ch. 85, § 20 (1927)). Our account differs from that of Richard Booth,
who outlines a short history of premiums in appraisal and contrasts discounts and the
law of appraisal in and outside of Delaware. Booth, supra note 13, at 132-45.
24 Chicago Corp., 172 A. at 455.
25 Id. at 454-55.
26 Id. at 456. This predates and is inconsistent with both portfolio theory and the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), with its conclusion that a stock's rate of return is
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The court did note that market values were sometimes valid for
items such as chattel and stock in a company not set to merge, since, if
paid the market value, an individual "could easily step into the market
and replace presumably at the quoted prices the chattels [sic] or stock
which the defendant converted. 2 7 Nevertheless, the court ruled that
the only way the plaintiff could be made whole was to give him the
"intrinsic value" of his shares.8 While this decision predates modem
portfolio theory,29 it set a precedent for the focus on "intrinsic value20
and wrongly concluded that each company's stock is a unique finan-
cial asset. It is understandable that a court in 1934 might not under-
stand how fungible any one share is in a diversified portfolio; however,
it is remarkable that the court's conclusion, based on this misunder-
standing-that "intrinsic value" diverges from (and is presumably
greater than) market value in some systematic way-continues to this
day.
set by its systematic risk, i.e. its beta, and that firm-specific risk of a stock is irrelevant to
rational, diversified investors. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 3, 195-203 (discussing
the relationship between risk and return under the rubric of CAPM). In this context,
all stocks with the same beta become substitutes for each other in a well-diversified
portfolio. Id. at 199-201.
27 Chicago Corp., 172 A. at 456.
28 See id. (""'[T] he value of the stock" means not merely the market price if the
stock is traded in by the public, but the intrinsic value, to determine which all the as-
sets and liabilities must be ascertained."' (quoting Cole v. Wells, 113 N.E. 189, 191
(Mass. 1916))).
29 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 3, at 187-88 (linking Harry Markowitz's 1952
article, Portfolio Selection, with the birth of modern portfolio theory); Harry Markowitz,
Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 77 (1952) (giving an early perspective on the "second
stage" of selecting a portfolio, which "starts with the relevant beliefs about future per-
formances and ends with the choice of portfolio").
30 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485, 493 (Del. 2000) ("'At
present, the statute requires the court to appoint an appraiser who is charged with the
obligation of determining the fair or intrinsic value of the stock which is being ap-
praised."' (quoting Commentary to H.B. 916, 128th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Del.
1976))); Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 553 (Del. 2000) (noting that
value means "'true or intrinsic value"' (quoting Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74
A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950))); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166
(Del. 1995) (defining the true value as that which is "'determined under the appraisal
proceedings"' (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del.
1993))); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Del. 1989) ("A share-
holder who dissents from a cash-out merger is nonetheless entitled to receive the fair
or intrinsic value of his shares."); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 878 (Del. 1985)
(finding that directors must assess the intrinsic value of their company before approv-
ing a merger). For a skeptical view of intrinsic value, see William J. Carney, Fairness
Opinions: How Fair Are They and Why We Should Do Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q.
523, 526-27 (1992).
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B. The "Going Concern" Doctrine
Subsequently, in Ti-Continental Corp. v. Battye,1 the Delaware Su-
preme Court developed the doctrine that a shareholder's interest in a
company is a pro rata share of the value of the shareholders' equity in
a going concern. The court did not address either control premiums
or minority discounts. Rather, it addressed shares in a closed-end mu-
tual fund that had traded at a discount from the fund's net asset value
prior to a merger.3 3 In this context, the court declined to value shares
at their net asset value, but instead followed the appraiser's method-
ology, which constructed a value of the entire fund based on its "fair
asset value" and then discounted this value at the same rate that the
shares were discounted by the market prior to the merger.4 Thus,
nothing in the opinion pointed directly toward a control premium,
except a possible strained interpretation of dicta in the case.3 5 Essen-
tially, the court held that since shareholders invested in assets the
value of which was discounted by virtue of their ownership by a closed-
end fund (with its presumed agency costs), it was fair to compensate
exiting investors in the same way.s6 We call this the rule of "in at a dis-
count, out at a discount."
The next "going concern" decision was Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 7
where a huge disparity existed between the net asset value and the
market value of a firm. s8 Once again the court rejected attempts to
use net asset value as the measure of value, because the corporation• • • 39
was not liquidating. Therefore, the court held, the corporation must
be valued on a going concern basis and simply quoted its own earlier
31 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950).
32 Id. at 72.
33 Id. at 72-73.
34 Id. at 75.
35 See id. at 76 ("The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that the full value of the
corporate assets to the corporation is not the same as the value of those assets to the
common stockholder because of the factor of discount.").
36 The reference to diminution of net asset value is our characterization, not the
court's. For studies documenting the phenomenon, see Michael J. Barclay et. al., Pri-
vate Benefits from Block Ownership and Discounts on Closed-End Funds, 33J. FIN. ECON. 263,
263-64 (1993).
37 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
38 Id. at 145 (weighting the asset value of $456 per share at 40% and the capital-
ized earnings value of $120 per share at 60%).
39 Id. at 141-42 (quoting Ti-Continental, 74 A.2d at 74). Similarly, in Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952), the court stated that a dissenting
shareholder was entitled to receive "the substantial equivalent in value of the shares he
held before the merger," and was not entitled to a share of the firm's liquidating value.
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decision in Tri-Continental for the proposition that the shareholder is
to be compensated for her proportionate interest in a going con-
cern.40 Once again, the decision was more concerned with the meth-
ods for valuing the entire firm than with the proportion to be received
by each shareholder. The "proportionate interest" language could
fairly be described as dicta. As in Tri-Continental, shareholders who
bought into a company, the asset value of which was reduced by
agency costs, were not allowed to measure their value upon exit on
another basis.
The question of minority discounts, while not directly relevant to
our consideration of the value of an entire firm, played a role in the
valuation formulation in Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett.4' That case in-
volved the valuation of a minority shareholder's 1.5% interest in a
42closely held corporation where there was no market for the shares.
In an appraisal proceeding, the chancery court valued the entire cor-
poration. On appeal, the majority stockholders argued that Harnett's
small interest should have been subjected to a minority discount. The
Delaware Supreme Court rejected this argument, citing Tri-Continental
and Bell for the "proportionate interest" dicta, and concluded that "to
fail to accord to a minority shareholder the full proportionate value of
his shares imposes a penalty for lack of control, and unfairly enriches
the majority shareholders who may reap a windfall from the appraisal
process by cashing out a dissenting shareholder, a clearly undesirable
result., 43 Closely held corporations are not within the set of cases we
discuss here, and thus we do not address the logic or wisdom of the
holding in Cavalier. We do believe, however, that the result in Cavalier
is not compelled by the holdings of the going concern cases for pub-
licly traded shares. The real point is that Cavalier, like earlier deci-
sions, provides no support for the imputation of a control premium in
all appraisal cases in order to obtain an "intrinsic value." Neverthe-
less, the cases we have discussed form the doctrinal basis for the con-
trol premium cases that followed.
40 Bell, 413 A.2d at 141.
41 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
42 Id. at 1144.
43 Id. at 1145.
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C. The Market Price and Minority Discount Argument
Delaware began approaching its modern formulation of value in
1985, in Smith v. Van Gorkom.44 In that case, the court held that a
board's reliance on the market price of Trans Union's stock was un-
justified if the board's task was to determine the intrinsic value of a
firm for purposes ofjudging the adequacy of a sale price.45 At issue
was a proposed control transaction that reasonably anticipated a pre-
mium. 46 The Delaware Supreme Court stated that "[t]he parties do
not dispute that a publicly-traded stock price is solely a measure of the
value of a minority position and, thus, market price represents only
the value of a single share."47  This assumption that the whole is
greater than the sum of its parts is the first suggestion of the content
of "intrinsic value.
48
The use of control premiums was not fully developed in Delaware
until the 1992 decision of Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris.49 The subject
corporation, Rapid-American Corp. (Rapid) was a diversified holding
company with three operating subsidiaries providing virtually all of its
income.50 The dominant shareholder group, controlled by Meshulam
Riklis, had acquired 46.5% of Rapid's stock over the preceding seven51
years. The merger, which took the company private, resulted in
the cash-out of holders of approximately 53.5% of Rapid's stock.52
The market price of Rapid's stock, unaffected by the announcement
of the merger, was $17.25 per share. 53 The cash-out provided cash and
securities valued at approximately $28 per share, representing a 62%
44 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
45 Id. at 875-76.
46 One of us has argued elsewhere that predicting control premiums in the con-
text of a contemplated control transaction is an impossible exercise, because it involves
predicting the outcome of an auction. Carney, supra note 30, at 532-35.
488 A.2d at 876.
48 The court relied in part on claims by Trans Union managers that its stock was
"undervalued," and acknowledged that this was a widely held view of managers. Id.
One could also characterize this as a cognitive bias entitled to little or no credence.
The valuation question is clouded by Trans Union's possession of tax benefits it could
not utilize in its current form, but we fail to see how this differs from the valuable as-
sets trapped in a closed-end fund or the timber holdings of Kirby Lumber, at least in
the context of an appraisal proceeding.
49 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992).
50 Id. at 799.
51 Id. at 799-800.
52 Id. at 800.




premium. 4 In the appraisal proceeding, the company's experts val-
ued Rapid as a conglomerate, which it was. The dissenter's expert, on
the other hand, disaggregated the company and valued its subsidiaries
separately, reasoning that while there were no comparable conglom-
erates, there were companies comparable to each of the subsidiaries.55
Having reached a market value for each of the subsidiaries, the dis-
senter's expert then added a control premium, because Rapid owned
all the stock of each subsidiary. 56 Citing Tri-Continental as authority for
valuation adjustments (from net asset value) at the corporate level,
the Delaware Supreme Court approved the addition of a control pre-
mium to the extrapolated market value for each subsidiary.7 The
court noted that the dissenter's expert had valued the subsidiaries by
using the market price of similar shares and that "[t] hese shares pre-
sumptively traded at a price that discounted the 'control premium.
' 58
The court concluded that "[t] he exclusion of a 'control premium' ar-
tificially and unrealistically treated Rapid as a minority shareholder.
Contrary to Rapid's arguments, Delaware law compels the inclusion of a
control premium under the unique facts of this case.,
59
The "unique facts" to which the court referred must have been
Rapid's status as a holding company, which operated only through its
three wholly-owned subsidiaries.60 This approach was followed in M.G.
Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, in which the holding company pos-
sessed a majority interest in two operating banks."' In that case, the
54 Rapid-Am. Corp., 603 A.2d at 798, 800.
55 Id. at 800. Disaggregating Rapid and valuing its assets separately from the con-
glomerate as a going concern was an approach previously rejected in both Tn-
Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 76-77 (Del. 1950) and Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.,
413 A.2d 137, 141 (Del. 1980). It omits the discount from asset values caused by the
agency costs that inhere in the conglomerate form. In contrast, Ti-Continental Corp.'s
valuation process reflected these agency costs. 74 A.2d at 77.
56 Harris v. Rapid-Am. Corp., No. 6462, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 166, at *18-20 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 2, 1990).
57 Rapid-Am. Corp., 603 A.2d at 805-06.
56 Id. at 806.
59 Id.
60 In M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513 (Del. 1999), the court re-
jected as too narrow the argument that the "unique fact" in Rapid-American was that its
subsidiaries were involved in three separate industries. Id. at 525. "Therefore, any
holding company's ownership of a controlling interest in a subsidiary at the time of the
merger is an 'operative reality' and an independent element of value that must be
taken into account in determining a fair value for the parent company's stock." Id.
61 Id.
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court sanctioned valuation of subsidiaries based on acquisition prices
paid for comparable banks. 2
This doctrine could have been limited to the valuation of holding
companies. It began modestly in Tri-Continental with the holding
that the market value of assets, namely marketable securities, could be
adjusted to reflect their diminished value when held by a closed-end
investment company.6 While the Delaware Supreme Court has re-
cently noted this fact, it has declined to limit adjustments in market
values to such cases.65 Rather, the Delaware Chancery Court has ex-
tended this approach to all corporate valuations, holding that valua-
tion based on analysis of comparable companies "produces an equity
valuation that inherently reflects a minority discount .... Because
that value is not fully reflective of the intrinsic worth of the corpora-
tion on a going concern basis, this court has applied an explicit con-
trol premium in calculating the fair value of the equity in an appraisal
proceeding."66  At this point numerous decisions apply this ap-
67proach.
Unfortunately this approach misses an important feature of the
Tri-Continental decision: In valuing a closed-end investment company,
62 Id.; see also Hintmann v. Fred Weber, Inc., No. 12839, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26,
*26-31 (Del. Ch. Feb. 17, 1998) (adding a control premium to determine the value of
shares in a merger with corporation's holding company).
63 Most interestingly, with respect to the diversified holding companies structure,
any "control premium" based on the holding company's ownership might actually be
negative. See James A. Miles & James D. Rosenfeld, The Effect of Voluntary Spin-off An-
nouncements on Shareholder Wealth, 38J. FIN. 1597, 1597 (1983) (analyzing the effects of
spin-offs and finding that spin-off announcements enhance shareholder wealth);James
D. Rosenfeld, Additional Evidence on the Relation Between Divestiture Announcements and
Shareholder Wealth, 39J. FIN. 1437, 1437-38 (1984) (continuing the analysis described in
the previous article).
Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 76-77 (Del. 1950).
65 Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 556 (Del. 2000) (citing Rapid-Am.
Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 1992)).
Borruso v. Communications Telesystems Int'l., 753 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. Ch.
1999) (citing Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. 11107, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS
75, at *6 (Del. Ch.June 15, 1995)).
67 See, e.g., Bomarko, Inc. v. Int'l Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1185-86 (Del.
Ch. 1999) (rejecting defendant's contention that a comparable company valuation
need not incorporate a control premium); Borruso, 753 A.2d at 458-59 (noting that this
approach is "particularly appropriate [when] the comparable company method is the
only method available to [value the shares]"); Kleinwort Benson, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS
75, at *6-7 (stating that the expert's comparison study needed to be adjusted to com-
pensate for the minority discount); Salomon Bros. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., No.
10054, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100, at *16-17 (Del. Ch. May 1, 1992) (recognizing that
premium value is often used in acquisitions).
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the court in Tri-Continental valued the assets as they existed in a going
concern-that is, at a discount from each asset's independent fair
market value. This discount, which some say exists because of the
agency costs of closed-end firms,68 would persist until the firm was liq-
uidated or acquired by some other type of firm with lower agency
costs. At the same time, if control blocks in closed-end firms enable
owners to extract private benefits at the expense of the public share-
holders, these blocks should trade at a premium.9 In short, it is im-
portant to note that the court did not calculate firm value as if a
change of control were about to occur. Rather, it assumed the con-
tinuing management of the business as it then existed-with no value-
creating control transaction.
The current approach leads Delaware courts to speculate about
takeover values under circumstances where the probability of a take-
over may be quite remote, as it was in Rapid-American. This approach
also leads courts into the risky exercise of predicting control premi-
ums if companies were sold, which are precisely the "speculative ele-
ments of value [that] should be excluded from the valuation calcu-
lus."
70
II. THE CONTROL PREMIUM LITERATURE
We introduce this topic with a qualification and an explanation.
Our arguments only apply to those companies with stock traded
in what are commonly understood to be efficient capital markets,
where stock prices are set in an unbiased (competitive) manner and
reflect all publicly available information. The basic conclusion of the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) is that market values
of companies' shares traded in competitive and open markets are
68 See Barclay et al., supra note 36, at 282 (stating that "[o]thers have tried to ex-
plain discounts by focusing on the traditional agency conflict between owners and
managers").
69 See id. at 268, 276-81 (demonstrating that the presence of large block holdings
increases the discounts from net asset value in closed-end funds from four percent to
fourteen percent, and examining the ways in which blockholders extract benefits not
shared with public stockholders). Were these large blocks to be transferred, we as-
sume that these benefits would be priced, thus creating a premium over market prices.
70 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publ'rs, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 362 (Del. 1997); see also
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 295 (Del. 1996) (explaining that the
"future values" allowed in a value calculation under Weinberger do not include those
elements of future value that "but for the merger... would not exist"); Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) ("[E]lements of future value.., which are
known or susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and not the product of
speculation may be considered.").
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unbiased estimates of the value of the equity of such firms.71 We do
not claim that any market is perfectly efficient; that is not a necessary
condition of our argument. Rather, we claim that a presumption
should be employed that market prices are efficiently set and rea-
sonably accurate absent convincing evidence to the contrary. Given
the courts' institutional difficulties in making alternative estimates of
value, it is only prudent to minimize the adversarial process, in which
two experts take polar positions, by giving deference to market val-
ues.73 For those with greater skepticism about ECMH, in Part III we
offer an alternative argument about fairness and in Part IV we demon-
strate the conflicts created by the control premium decisions.
We do not address appraisal valuations in second-stage takeout
mergers that follow a successful takeover bid.74 We also do not deal
with closely-held corporations and the related problems of minority
and liquidity discounts, where there is no ascertainable market price.75
71 Without engaging in a full discussion of ECMH, this is generally what is referred
to as semi-strong form efficiency. We do not digress to discuss recent challenges to
ECMH, except to note that ECMH remains, in the view of some, one of the best-
established hypotheses in all the social sciences. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 21, at 11
(noting that "[a] lthough the evidence is not literally 100 percent in support of the effi-
cient market hypothesis, there is no better documented proposition in any of the so-
cial sciences"); see also RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Mar-
ket Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1984) ("ECMH is now the context in which
serious discussion of the regulation of financial markets takes place"); Ok-Rial-Song,
Hidden Social Costs of Open Market Share Repurchases, 27J. CORP. L. 425, 452 (2002) (stat-
ing that empirical studies have left no doubt that ECMH is still a "fundamental para-
digm[] for analyzing modern capital markets in current studies of corporate law and
financial economics" (footnotes omitted)). Close corporations present a different set
of problems, which depend in part on how one views the absence of contractual pro-
tection for minority shareholders as affecting the value of their shares.
72 See Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880, 890 (Del. 2002) ("[A] well-
informed, liquid trading market will provide a measure of fair value superior to any
estimate the court could impose.").
73 For an illustration of the difficulties with valuation in the adversarial context,
see Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *4-5 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 19, 1990), where rival appraisers valued the stock at $62.75 and $13.14, which
Chancellor Allen attributed to the "dynamics of litigation." Chancellor Allen thought
that the problem was so great that he discussed the merits of simply selecting the valua-
tion of one of the two appraisers-noting the power such a decision would have in per-
suading experts to employ more reasonable assumptions. Id. at *27 n.17.74
While the Rapid-American merger involved a 47.9% shareholder, that block was
accumulated over seven years through a combination of purchases by the shareholder
and repurchases by Rapid-American. Harris v. Rapid-Am. Corp., No. 6462, 1990 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 166, at *2-3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 1990).
75 The problem of disparity of treatment in close corporations is more complex.
Shareholders have the ability to protect themselves against freeze-outs by contract,
but apparently a significant number fail to do so. F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations:
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Finally, we do not focus on the question of whether market prices may
be depressed because the controlling shareholder has extracted ex-
cessive (and presumably illegal) private benefits from the corpora-
76tion .
A. Common Sense About Control Premiums
The received economic wisdom of courts may contain some fun-
damental misconceptions about value. The misunderstanding in-
volved is understandable, in part, because control premiums are ob-
servable. It also has a certain intuitive quality that seems to confirm its
truthfulness. Whenever control of a company is transferred, one can
easily observe that the transfer occurs at a price above the pre-
announcement market value of the shares.
A rich empirical literature demonstrates that these premiums ex-
ist, and that they can be large. For instance, MichaelJensen estimated
shareholder gains from mergers and acquisitions at $40 billion be-
tween 1981 and 1985." Joseph Grundfest and Bernard Black found
78total shareholder gains of $167 billion between 1981 and 1986. A
third study found premiums of $118.4 billion in the same period.79
From this, it is easy to see how one could conclude that such premi-
ums inhere in all companies and should be considered in any particu-
lar company's appraisal. The intuitive appeal stems from the desire
to protect minorities from overreaching by majorities, and the appar-
ent belief that whenever any minority shareholder receives something
Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 BUS. LAw. 873, 881 (1978) (attributing
this failure to the fact that many minority shareholders do not anticipate dissension or
oppression, and are not aware of their own vulnerabilities). Whether fairness requires
minority shareholders to live with the consequences of their inaction, or requires im-
position of a burden on controlling shareholders to bargain ex-ante, is a question that
complicates this issue. For a discussion of placing burdens on parties who are most
aware of contract choices, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 101-07 (1989).
76 Where the price is so depressed, we presume that a derivative action would be
available against the controlling shareholder and that the expected value of that re-
cove7 is an element of going concern value to be added to market value.
Jensen, supra note 21, at 7.
78 News Release, Joseph Grundfest & Bernard Black, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Stock Market Profits from Takeover Activity Between 1981 and 1986:
$167 Billion is a Lot of Money (Sept. 28, 1987) (on file with author).
79 Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence
Since 1980,J. ECON. PERSPS., Winter 1988, at 49, 49; see also Hamermesh, supra note 17,
at 886, 913 App. A tbl.1 (offering further evidence of large control premiums).
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different in kind (e.g., shares rather than cash), there has been some
element of overreaching or unfairness.
Our reason for suggesting that this conclusion is a misunderstand-
ing is relatively simple: control premiums only occur in transactions
involving a transfer of control, where there are thought to be gains
from trade, either because of a perception by the purchaser that the
transaction offers some opportunity to create new value within the
target firm8 or because the bidder believes that the market value of
the target's shares is depressed and it can earn an abnormal return by
holding target shares until the market price reflects full value.8 ' Even
if all values, both present and potential, are valued in the market price
for the firm's shares, one would not expect to find a discernible con-
trol premium in a widely held firm that is well managed and appears
to offer little probability of a transfer of control. Any small probability
of a control transaction will already be reflected in the market price,
because absent a dominant shareholder, all shareholders expect to
have an equal opportunity to share in any such premium, should it
appear. Absent an actual transfer of control, control premiums repre-
sent probabilities of a control transfer at a premium. Where the
probability is close to zero, so is the premium.
B. Stories of Separate Markets
We turn now to the academic discussion of the market for corpo-
rate control and the arguments concerning control premiums that
80 These premiums are offered in public tender offers in order to overcome free-
rider problems. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider
Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELLJ. ECON. 42, 42-43 (1980) (noting that
shareholders can free ride on a bidder's improvement of a poorly run corporation af-
ter a successful takeover bid, thereby limiting the raider's profit and making the take-
over less likely to occur). In the case of a negotiated purchase of control from a single
shareholder or a group, the premium is offered both to account for the private bene-
fits controlling shareholders receive and to provide a price that at least meets their res-
ervation price, but may well be higher because of the uncertainties of negotiating un-
der conditions of bilateral monopoly. For example, in Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., Vice
Chancellor Hartnett rejected the blended value of a takeover bid as the measure of the
target's value on the date of the merger, stating that it "is often an unreliable guide to
the true market value because it may reflect a control premium and other factors con-
nected with the acquiror's [sic] intentions but unrelated to the value of the firm as a
going concern." No. 7244, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at *22 (Del. Ch.June 8, 1993).
8 ECMH suggests that some of these bidders are correct and some are not, but
that there is no way to determine this except to wait to see what actually happens to the
market price. The evidence to date is not encouraging for bidders. See, e.g., Black, su-
pra note 17 (exploring several possible explanations for bidder overpayments).
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have flowed from it. As explained above, we argue that control pre-
82miums are reflected in all stock prices.
The phrase "market for corporate control" was introduced in 1965
by Henry Manne's classic article, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control.83 Manne introduced the concept of a market for corporate
control without claiming that it was somehow separate from the mar-
ket for small lots of shares. He simply argued that, as management
quality and effort declined, so did expected earnings, so that stock
prices would decline relative to those of well-managed companies. A
lower stock price would both facilitate and provide the impetus for
takeovers, costly as they might be. He observed that "the potential re-
turn from the successful take-over and revitalization of a poorly run
company can be enormous. ", 4 While other explanations of gains have
since been offered, Manne's explanation remains a central one. It in-
tegrates control transactions with trading transactions in an important
way. For instance, a takeover bid introduces important new informa-
tion about the value of a firm-that someone, other than current
management, believes they could achieve greater cash flows for inves-
tors from the existing assets.8 5 In the parlance of efficient market
analysis, this is "news." The fact that a takeover bid is a low-probability
event for many firms explains why prices of even badly managed firms
do not rise to reflect the full value of a potential control premium;
86they reflect only its expected value under conditions of uncertainty.
Many firms are well managed, or at least not much more badly man-
aged then the average, and consequently offer few potential gains in a
takeover. In such a case, both the probability of and expected gains
from a takeover bid may be trivial. But in both cases, efficient markets
should set prices to reflect the particular situation of each firm.
Not all scholars accept this view. One counterexplanation has
been offered by Martin Shubik: "These assumptions [of efficient capi-
tal markets] ... are set up to rule out, by assumption, the possibility
82 Supra Part II.A.
83 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110, 112 (1965). For a review of the impact of this and other articles by Manne regard-
ing takeover premiums, see William J. Carney, The Legacy of "The Market for Corporate
Control" and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASEW. RES. L. REv. 215 (1999).
84 Manne, supra note 83, at 113.
85 The market price of the target's stock reflects the anticipated takeover bid in
advance of its announcement. See Michael Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Mar-
ket for Corporate Control, 53J. Bus. 345, 361-65 (1980) (illustrating the predicted time
series of the share prices of target firms involved in successful tender offers).
86 Id.
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that the market for a few shares of the stock of a corporation and the
market for control of a corporation may be fundamentally different
markets. 's7 Shubik elaborates on his challenge to the law of one price:
The lawyers may talk about a premium for control. But to a true be-
liever of efficient markets, there cannot be a premium for control. If, in
contradistinction to the adherents of the single, efficient market, we
suggest that there are several more or less imperfect markets involving
the market for a few shares, the market for control, the market for go-
ing-business assets, and the market for assets in liquidation, then we have
a structure for interpreting what is going on in terms of arbitrage among
these different markets.8
Shubik's argument uses the term "market" loosely. Stigler has
described a "market" as a situation where prices of homogeneous
goods are identical. 89 Discrete markets exist when different prices ap-
pear, which are generally not arbitraged away because of transaction
costs, transportation costs, or cultural differences that inhibit com-
plete arbitrage.90 Significantly different prices are not observed for
the same stock at the same time, except perhaps in the irrelevant
87 Martin Shubik, Corporate Control, Efficient Markets, and the Public Good, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 31, 32-33
(John C. Coffee,Jr. et al. eds., 1988).
88 Id. at 33; see also Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market
Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1264-75 (1990) (arguing that
control premiums are generated by a downward-sloping demand curve). Shubik's lan-
guage was quoted by Chancellor Allen in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at *55. n.13 (Del. Ch. July 17,
1989). We believe Shubik is mistaken when he claims that true believers in efficient
capital markets hold that there cannot be a control premium. See generally Manne, su-
pra note 83. Shubik argues that, when hostile takeovers occur, conditions approximat-
ing zero transaction costs in perfectly competitive markets no longer exist. Shubik,
supra note 87, at 35-36. While he is correct, this point only goes to the probability and
size of a control premium. The fact that not all bad managers are removed by take-
overs because of these costs does not necessarily mean there are separate markets.
8) GEORGEJ. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 85 (3d ed. 1966); see also Joseph Sti-
glitz, Information, in THE FORTUNE ENCYLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 16 (David R.
Henderson ed., 1993) ("Under this law, there is a uniform price in the market, and
price differences are quickly eliminated by arbitrage."), http://www.econlib.org/
library/Enc/lnformation.html.90
Stiglitz, supra note 89. Shubik correctly argues that the pool of purchasers of a
firm's assets may be different (thinner) than the pool of purchasers of its shares. Shu-
bik, supra note 87, at 32-33. In some cases, if there is only one prospective asset pur-
chaser, conditions of bilateral monopoly exist, making prediction of the magnitude of
a control premium more difficult. But this does not address the probability that a
transaction in control will be reflected in the market price.
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sense of different reservation prices.9' A takeover bid appears in the
same market in which trading occurs, and the news of the bid instan-
taneously moves the market price to a new level, approximating trad-
ers' estimations of the bid's prospect for success, discounting for the
time value of money and the probability of oversubscription and pro-
rationing. Thus, there is no evidence of the simultaneous existence of
separate market prices for control and for minority interests. This
demonstrates that the law of one price prevails at any one time, and
that prices change only when the probability of an event, such as a
92change of control, changes.
Another version of the separate market story is offered without
any attempt at a theory: It simply asserts that all publicly traded shares
reflect an implicit minority discount.93  Responding to an assertion
without a theory is impossible and probably not worthwhile. Yet, un-
fortunately, it is the current operative assumption of the Delaware
courts.
While economists have developed sophisticated models demon-
strating how arbitrage occurs between markets,94 none of these models
are necessary in this context, because only one market exists for the
shares of each company.
91 In that sense, investors are price-takers, not price-searchers. Auctions exist to
deal with the problems of heterogeneous goods or traders, by allowing efficient price-
searching "where sellers are unsure about the values that bidders attach to the object
being sold." VIJAY KRISHNA, AUCTION THEORY 3 (2002). The New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE) is a "continuous auction market" that searches for prices intertempo-
rally, as "news" continuously alters reservation prices of both buyers and sellers. See
Mark Borelli, Market Making in the Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 822 (2001)
("The NYSE is a continuous auction market in which orders can be executed anytime
the exchange is open.").
92 Coates provides an expanded description of arbitrage under these conditions,
pointing out that the presence of a controlling shareholder in the target means that
market prices will also reflect the risk that a bidder will acquire control directly from
the controlling shareholder and the probability that the new controlling shareholder
will deal more or less fairly with the minority shareholders. John C. Coates IV, "Fair
Value" as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions,
147 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1265 n.46 (1999) (citing Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and
Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q.J. ECON. 957, 961-64 (1994)).
93 SHANNON P. PRATT ET AL., VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL
OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 304-05 (3d ed. 1996); see also Coates, supra note 92, at
1265 & n.46.
94 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Com-
petitive Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954) (setting out a competitive economy
equilibrium theory).
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C. Assertions of Demand Elasticities
Another argument that markets provide unreliable information
about firm values is primarily authored by Lynn Stout, who argues that
shares of particular corporations are unique and thus scarce assets
with downward-sloping demand curves.9 This theory also implies an
upward-sloping supply curve in the face of a takeover bid.96 Under
this theory, the market price of shares is an unreliable indicator of
value, because unless one knows the slope of the demand curve, one
cannot calculate the subjective gains of those valuing their shares at
less than the takeover price and the subjective losses of those who
value their shares at a higher price. Stout's views seem to be in accord
with those of many courts that decline to be guided by market values
in an appraisal process.97 The principal difficulty with this argument is
the assumption that a bidder will ever pay the reservation price of
those shareholders whose reservation prices are above the market
price.9s
This theory also directly contradicts modem portfolio theory,
which teaches that any investor can build a diversified portfolio by us-
ing a variety of financial instruments (minimizing nonsystematic risk)
to achieve the desired level of risk and return (accounting for system-
atic risk).99 Hence, the aphorism, "seen one stock, seen them all."' 00
According to modem portfolio theory, the demand curve for any
stock facing a particular selling shareholder is flat (varying reservation
95 Stout, supra note 88, at 1239; see also Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 454-55
(Del. Ch. 1934) ("The relation of supply to demand on a given day as truly affects the
market value of a stock as it does of a commodity; and temporary supply and demand
are in turn affected by numerous circumstances which are wholly disconnected from
considerations having to do with the stock's inherent worth.").
96 See Stout, supra note 88, at 1267 ("Less-than-unanimous shareholder approval of
merger and asset sales ... forces dissenting shareholders to part with their shares for a
price they believe inadequate.").
97 See, e.g., M.P.M. Enterprises v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 797 (Del. 1999) ("[T]he
fairness of the price on the open market is not the overriding consideration."); Harris
v. Rapid-Am. Corp., No. 6462, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1992).
Since Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983), market value has been
just one of many factors used to determine value.
98 There are other serious difficulties with Stout's arguments. SeeJ. Gregory Sidak
& Susan E. Woodward, Takeover Premiums, Appraisal Rights and the Price Elasticity of a
Firm's Publicly Traded Stock, 25 GA. L. REv. 783, 785-86 (1991) ("Stout's claim of less-
than-infinite price elasticity does not advance her thesis that the market price of a se-
curit is an unreliable and unfair measure of value.").
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 3, at 191-201.
100 Id. at 375.
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prices among some prospective buyers notwithstanding), 7 and the
supply curve facing any buyer (not signaling a prospective takeover
bid or possession of material nonpublic information) is equally flat.
In short, absent a takeover bid, no shareholder can obtain more than
the present market price for her shares when selling them. We are all
price-takers, absent a takeover bid.
D. Coordination Costs: Private Benefits of Complete Ownership
To the extent that shareholders are heterogeneous and dispersed,
conflicts may arise among them over divergent preferences for firm
distributions, investments, and risky projects. ° 2 If controlling share-
holders can resolve these conflicts in their favor, then value would be
added to their shares at the expense of the minority's shares, with lit-
tle risk of being held liable for wrongdoing.0 3 Controlling sharehold-
ers may also receive some private benefits by reallocating firm re-
sources to directly benefit themselves, thereby taking value from
minority shareholders. Several studies have found that large blocks
persistently trade at premiums-absent any attempt to engage in a
takeover-suggesting that markets may price these private benefits.
0 4
While the potential for the benefits through misallocation of firm
resources is undeniable, the probability that these activities are signifi-
cant enough to account for the magnitude of control premiums in a
101 For an argument that demand curves slope downward, based on observed price
increases upon the announcement of the inclusion of a stock in the Standard & Poor's
500 Index, see Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579
(1986). The most probable explanation, according to Shleifer, is that an outward shift
in the demand curve occurs because index funds must now purchase the stock, and
the increased demand pushes the demand curve outward and places the new equilib-
rium further out on what is implicitly an upward-sloping demand curve. Id. at 580.
While this suggests that increasing demand from groups of investors such as index
funds may affect price (without any information signal), it does not challenge the es-
sential flatness of the curves facing individual investors. Indeed, it is impossible to dif-
ferentiate between moves along one curve or the other (with either or both having a
slight slope) and a shift in that curve.
102 William J. Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs, Control Pre-
miums and Capital Structure, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 5 (1987). Generally these problems
are solved either by the constituency effect, in which shareholders invest in firms with
announced policies they prefer, or by diversification.
103 See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (sustaining a
dividend increase over minority shareholders' objections).
104 See, e.g., Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, Private Benefits from Control
of Public Corporations, 25J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1989) (finding that large blocks trade at a
twenty percent premium over market); see also Barclay et al., supra note 36, at 275-81
(detailing some of the private benefits received from control of closed-end funds).
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significant number of cases is likely negligible because of the stringent
legal rules against such activity.'0 5 On the other hand, the minimiza-
tion of coordination costs and the ability to decide among distribution
and investment opportunities are benefits that can never flow to
shareholders generally. Instead, most shareholders must select com-
panies that have credibly signaled policies that correspond to their
own preferences. To the extent that other private benefits are similar
to agency costs, they too cannot be shared with public investors. Ei-
ther a controlling shareholder captures them or management itself
captures them (although they are called agency costs). In competitive
markets these costs are irreducible, because the marginal costs of fur-
ther monitoring and prevention devices exceed marginal gains.' °
III. THE FAIRNESS ARGUMENTS
In Part II, we argued that in the absence of an imminent and read-
ily valued control transaction, receipt of the market price by minority
shareholders in effect gives them their pro rata share of the value of
the firm. In this Part, we relax the assumption that shares are traded
in efficient capital markets that formed the basis for the discussion in
Part II. Indeed, for present purposes, whether market prices fully re-
flect all publicly available information and result in prices being set in
an unbiased manner is largely irrelevant. All we assume in this Part is
that investors know when a controlling shareholder dominates corpo-
rate policy, along with whatever probabilities that creates for a freeze-
out transaction or some disproportionate distribution of the benefits
that flow from stock ownership. Lacking other legal guidance, we de-
fine "unfairness" here as a failure to receive bargained-for property
105 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 722-23 (holding a parent corporation li-
able for failure to pay a subsidiary promptly and take all product required under an
output contract); see also Roger C. Graham, Jr. & Craig E. Lefanowicz, Majority and Mi-
nority Ownership of Publicly-Traded Firms: A Test of the Value of Control Using Market Multi-
ples, 26J. Bus. FIN. & Accr. 171, 183-92 (1999) (presenting evidence that expropria-
tion benefits are not included in the valuation of target companies). But see Barclay et
al., supra note 36, at 285 (arguing that the discount from net asset value reflected in
the market value of shares of closed-end funds reflects, inter alia, the ability of large
block holders to divert profits to themselves).
106 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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rights. °7 What follows is a discussion of what public investors really
own.
A. What Property Rights Are Relinquished by a Dissenting Shareholder?
1. Public Shareholders' Expectations of Control of Their Firm
The Delaware courts have stated that in appraisal proceedings the
courts are to assume that the dissenting shareholder would have pre-
ferred to remain a shareholder in the original enterprise. This under-
lies the statement in Tri-Continental that "the stockholder is entitled to
be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportion-
ate interest in a going concern."' 8 Thus, in M.G. Bancorporation v. Le
Beau,'0 9 the Delaware Chancery Court rejected an appraisal based on
market values, because the witness "had determined only the 'fair
market value' of MGB's minority shares, as opposed to valuing MGB
in its entirety as a going concern and then determining the fair value
of the minority shares as a pro rata percentage of that value.""0 The
Delaware courts have thus moved from a presumption that a public
shareholder only owns a minority interest (in sale of control cases) to
a claim of entitlement to a pro rata share of firm value. Implicitly, this
gives the investor a right to a pro rata share of all the benefits flowing
from the corporation to its owners.11
107 See Benjamin Hermalin & Alan Schwartz, Buyouts in Large Companies, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 351, 361-62 (1996) ("Property theory... implies that a minority share-
holder's rights derive only from the corporate contract.").
108 Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950). The court stated
that "fair value" must be equal to what the shareholder "would have received ... in one
way or another as long as the company continued in business." Id. at 76. Ironically,
the court also stated that the only way for a shareholder to receive value is "by the sale
of [his or her stock] on the market," which would be at a discount if one assumes that
discounts generally exist. Id.
109 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513 (Del. 1999)
o Id. at 518 (citing Nebel v. Southwest Bancorp, No. 13618, 1995 WL 405750, at
*4 (Del. Ch.July 5, 1995)).
II The Delaware Supreme Court has noted:
The underlying assumption in an appraisal valuation is that the dissenting
shareholders would be willing to maintain their investment position had the
merger not occurred. Accordingly, the Court of Chancery's task in an ap-
praisal proceeding is to value what has been taken from the shareholder, i.e.,
the proportionate interest in the going concern. To that end, this Court has
held that the corporation must be valued as an operating entity. We conclude
that the Court of Chancery did not adhere to this principle.
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996) (citations omitted).
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In addition to being an unrealistic reflection of the value to be
received on a sale of control, it does not reflect the reality of day-to-
day operations. A majority shareholder has exclusive control over
dividend policy, investment policy, and the timing of the sale or liqui-
dation of the firm. Any or all of these factors may-given different
situations about taxes, alternative investment opportunities, and the
like-impact different shareholders differently." 2  Despite the criti-
cism of an older line of commentary, 1 3 the control premium does not
appear to be explained generally by the ability to loot the firm or en-
gage in any wrongdoing and potential expropriation benefits appear
to be too small to influence the valuation of target companies.
4
This position also ignores the agency cost literature of the last
sixty years that has demonstrated the lack of control by public share-
holders." 5 The only solution to the agency cost problem, it is said, is
the acquisition of a large (control) block that allows the holder to cap-
ture enough of the benefits of monitoring to compensate for the loss
112 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971) (presenting
a minority shareholder's objection to "excessive" dividend payments). One suspects
that individuals facing top marginal income tax rates as high as ninety percent might
have felt differently about the benefits of dividends than a corporate majority share-
holder that could benefit from a one hundred percent dividends received deduction
under I.R.C. § 243 (1986). See generally Carney, supra note 102.
113 See, e.g., William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the
Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REv. 505, 509 (1965) (discussing the so-called "looting cases"
where a "purchaser buys a controlling block of stock at a premium over value,...
[and] utilizes his new place of power to steal from the corporation"); Eugene V. Ros-
tow, To Whom and for 14/hat Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE COR-
PORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 47 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959) (observing the
widely held view that "the act of [corporate] raiding breaches a standard of business
propriety with an even stronger claim to the loyalty of respectable opinion"). Manne,
supra note 83, at 112-13, rejects this argument on the basis that control premiums have
been too large to be justified by undetected looting.114
See Graham & Lefanowicz, supra note 105, at 175 (noting "that majority owner-
ship does not necessarily result in direct asset expropriation from minority sharehold-
ers").
115 See e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPO-
RATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 84 (1932) (asserting that a corporation's management
will be largely indifferent to the concerns of shareholders when "ownership is so widely
distributed that no individual or small group has even a minority interest large enough
to dominate the affairs of the company"); Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Struc-
ture of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1174 (1985)
("The higher cost and reduced profit that would be associated with this loosening in
owner control should be offset by lower capital acquisition cost or other profit-
enhancing aspects of diffuse ownership .... ); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 106, at
308 (defining agency costs as the sum of "(1) the monitoring expenditures by the




of diversification." 6 No one claims that public shareholders have the
ability to create value by reducing these costs.
Finally, this position of entitlement to remain a shareholder in a
going concern ignores the property rights of minority shareholders.
Minority shareholders do not have a right to remain shareholders
-however willing they may be-in the face of majority voting rules on
such questions as asset sales, liquidations, mergers and reverse stock
splits." 7 All of these events may cause the involuntary exit of minority
shareholders. In contrast to some other jurisdictions, only mergers
create dissenter's rights in Delaware." s In all other cases, absent fraud
or equitable grounds forjudicial interference, shareholders must take
what the transaction produces for them.
2. Public Shareholders' Expectations of a Control Premium
The sale of a control block of shares illuminates the law's general
policy in control transactions. Is it unfair for a controlling share-
holder to secure the entire control premium for itself by selling all its
shares? The judicial answer has almost universally been no." 9 Where
116 See Carney, supra note 102, at 12 ("The dominant stockholder, in a publicly
held firm, who is able to determine the outcome of firm decisions, is not subject to the
risks of losing arguments about firm policy."); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fis-
chel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 705 (1982) ("The sale of a control
bloc of stock.., allows the buyer to install his own management team, producing the
same gains available from a tender offer for a majority of shares but at lower cost to the
buyer."); cf Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Informa-
tion, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 830-33 (1985) (positing that because
"markets are at best 'relatively' efficient" it will be lucrative for potential investors to
avoid diversification and instead search for undervalued securities).
17 See, e.g., In re Resorts Int'l, Inc. S'holders Litig. Appeals, 570 A.2d 259, 268 (Del.
1990) ("This Court long ago rejected the concept that a shareholder has an absolute
right to remain a shareholder in the face of an otherwise legislatively recognized pro-
cedure for effecting a cash-out merger."); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d
331, 338 (Del. 1940) (noting that "the average intelligent mind must be held to know"
that the rights of preferred shareholders to dividend arrearages might be altered if the
issuing corporation merges with another corporation).
11 CompareDEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2001), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1
(West 1993) (allowing dissenter's rights upon merger, sale, lease, or exchange of as-
sets), and N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 910 (McKinney 1993) (permitting dissenter's rights
upon merger, sale, lease, exchange of assets, or share exchange).
119 The overwhelming body of judicial authority holds that a controlling share-
holder is entitled to extract a control premium when selling shares. See Robert W.
Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions: Where We Stand Today, 36 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 248, 249 (1985) ("It is unlikely that any American court today would reject the
general proposition that controlling shareholders may obtain a premium for their
shares which they need not share with other shareholders."). There are exceptions,
such as seizure of corporate opportunities and sales to looters, which are not relevant
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a controlling shareholder exists at the time of purchase, investors can
determine that the controlling shareholder may be the exclusive re-
cipient of a control premium and that investment and distribution
policies likely will be set by the controlling shareholder. Rational in-
vestors in efficient markets, aware of this possibility, will take those
features into account when setting the market price for the shares.
20
Thus, when minority shareholders are cashed out without receiving a
control premium, they have received exactly what they bargained for.
Further, the amount they receive, if no more than the pre-freeze-out
market value, will allow them to purchase a comparable financial as-
set.
Most shareholders in public corporations, other than founders
and their heirs, have purchased their shares in the initial public offer-
ing or in public markets after the firm has gone public. Under these
circumstances, if some of the arguments set out above are to be be-
lieved, founders may be said to have sold their shares at a "minority
discount." Any public shareholder contemplating a subsequent sale
of these shares will expect that the same discount will apply when she
sells. The rule of markets thus facing any public shareholder is "in
here. While Delaware has not faced this question directly, there has been no deviation
from the majority rule. In Krieger v. Anderson, 182 A.2d 907 (Del. 1962), the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal of a complaint by mutual fund shareholders
against owners of the former management company for a share of an alleged control
premium obtained. Rejecting the argument that several of the stockholders of the
management company were directors of the fund and thus owed their gains to the
fund, the court criticized the plaintiffs argument, which, taken to its logical conclu-
sion, would mean that management company shareholders "can never sell the shares
for what they are really worth." Id. at 910. In the court's estimation, "[t] his conclusion
offends one's sense of fairness." Id. In Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 224 (Del. Ch.
1990), plaintiffs argued that controlling shareholders had sold their control to a
looter. In dicta, Chancellor Allen stated:
While Delaware law has not addressed this specific question, one is not left
without guidance from our decided cases. Several principles deducible from
that law are pertinent. First, is the principle that a shareholder has a right to
sell his or her stock and in the ordinary case owes no duty in that connection
to other shareholders when acting in good faith.
Id. at 234 (citing Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 408 (Del. 1985)).
120 See John P. Bransfield, Proposal to Change the Federal Income Taxation of Marketable
Securities, 2 HOUS. Bus. & TAX L.J. 328, 373-74 (2002) (noting that "[n]o buyer would
pay that amount for a minority position because the buyer would not be in control of
operations of the corporation"); Douglas K Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-
Fact Contracts: Is the Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1060
n.275 (2001) (explaining that a minority shareholder will sometimes sell its shares at a
discount "on the theory that outside investors will pay less for a minority stake in a
close corporation because of their inability to control management").
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with a discount, out with a discount." Each purchaser of shares, quite
naturally, is only willing to pay for what she expects to get.
Under these circumstances, if minority shareholders obtain a pro
rata share of a control premium, they receive a windfall for which they
did not pay, and to which they had no reasonable expectation. That
gain, of course, results in a corresponding and equally unjustifiable
loss for the controlling shareholder.
B. The Pro Rata and Expectancy Arguments
There are basic assumptions of equality of treatment in most areas
of corporate law. Since Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,l2 the Delaware
courts have held that majority shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to theS 122
minority when they exercise control over the corporation. Victor
Brudney and Marvin Chirelstein famously argued for a sharing of the
gains in a parent-subsidiary merger, by analogizing the parent to a
trustee who is required to allocate benefits fairly between multiple
trusts.123 The rule they suggested was a pro rata sharing of the gains
obtained in a merger 4 -a rule that has not, to our knowledge, been
expressly adopted by any court. Later Delaware cases have sug-
gested that parent corporations owe a duty of "entire fairness" to the
public shareholders of the subsidiary and that this consists of both fair
dealing and fair price, but have thus far failed to distinguish fair price. • 126
in these circumstances from the appraisal valuation.
121 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952).
122 See e.g., Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 817 A.2d 149, 160
(Del. 2002) ("The right to vindicate breaches of fiduciary duty inflicted by a majority
stockholder on the minority is a central doctrine of Delaware law." (citing Sterling, 93
A.2d at 109-10)); Citron v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 500 (Del. Ch.
1990) ("[W]here a majority stockholder stands on both sides of a challenged transac-
tion, it has the burden of demonstrating.., that the transaction was entirely fair to the
minority." (citations omitted)).
123 Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and
Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 319-22 (1974). Valuation difficulties in making such a
rule operational, among other things, may explain why it has not been adopted.
Id. at 321.
125 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, however, approved lowering the weight
accorded market value in a "Delaware Block" method appraisal, citing Brudney &
Chirelstein's concerns that "an acquiring parent corporation which occupies the posi-
tion of a majority shareholder" may have nonpublic information about future values
not reflected in current market prices. In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby,
McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 64 (Me. 1979) (citing Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note
123, at 305).
126Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 704 (Del. 1983) ("While the present
state of these proceedings does not admit the plaintiff to the appraisal remedy per se,
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Assumptions of equal treatment are relaxed in certain areas be-
cause of a need to eliminate minority vetoes and provide for corporate
flexibility. Those approaching the problem from an economic and
property rights perspective have argued that unequal sharing is effi-
cient because it encourages value-creating control transactions.1
;
Some commentators have argued that the classic management lever-
aged buyout (MBO) requires such a sharing.2  This is in part because
an MBO may involve management's seizure of a corporate opportu-
nity under conditions where managers have nonpublic information
about values.129 But, the evidence thus far does not suggest that MBOs
involve any systematic abuse of shareholders, because the premiums
paid to public shareholders are of the same magnitude as those paid
in third-party transactions. Additionally, since all public sharehold-
ers share in such a premium, there is little reason to argue for an ad-
ditional premium above this price. Accurately measuring the gains to
the managers, however, is impossible. Indeed, in many cases bidders
have overestimated value, and paid public shareholders too much.13
This illustrates the extreme difficulties in measuring fairness in going
private transactions.
C. The Evidence from Contracts
In the case of mergers, particularly cash-out mergers following
takeover bids, there is ample evidence of what shareholders regard
as a fair price ex ante, as opposed to the ex post positions taken in
the practical effect of the remedy we do grant him will be co-extensive with the liberal-
ized valuation and appraisal methods we herein approve for cases coming after this
decision.").
127 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 116, at 704 (describing conditions
under which the directors' duty to maximize wealth may require unequal distribu-
tions); Hermalin & Schwartz, supra note 107, at 360-64 (arguing that the law should
award pre-investment market price in appraisals).
128 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can
Delaware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J.
CoRP. L. 359, 412 (1996) (noting that some see MBOs "as the product of a desire by
one group to exploit a business opportunity that requires the elimination of the mi-
nori "').
Id. at 408-12 (suggesting that value may differ from market price based on non-
public information which, if publicly available, would cause the market price to more
clearly reflect the manager's private knowledge).
Seejeffry Davis & Kenneth Lehn, Information Asymmetries, Rule 13e-3, and Premi-
ums in Going-Private Transactions, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 587, 594-603 (1992) (presenting
evidence that MBOs do not deprive shareholders of higher premiums).
131 See generally Black, supra note 17.
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appraisal proceedings. This evidence shows a strong reliance on mar-
kets and shareholder processes: any price agreed to by a specified ma-
jority of the shareholders in an uncoerced setting is deemed to be a
fair price at which the remaining shareholders can be cashed out.
3 2
To this end, hundreds and probably thousands of firms have adopted
"shark repellent" amendments to their charters.13 The most common
form of shark repellent provides that in the event of a takeout merger
with an "interested stockholder," a specified percentage of all shares
must approve the merger. This percentage is usually between two-
thirds and ninety-five percent. Sometimes, however, this superma-
jority rule is relaxed in response to one of two possible events: (1)
pre-takeover approval of the merger by the incumbent directors, who
presumably have fiduciary obligations to ensure that all shareholders
are treated fairly, or (2) the payment of a "fair price" to the remaining
public shareholders, typically defined as the highest price paid for
shares of the target by the successful bidder within the past two135
years. These charter amendments have required shareholder ap-
proval, suggesting that shareholders believe this provides adequate
protection of their interest in the company.
If shareholders vote in favor of such amendments and agree to ac-
cept prices consented to by a majority of their fellow shareholders,
why is a price determined in this manner not fair to them in the con-
text of an appraisal proceeding? To avoid this inconsistency, any
takeout merger following the acquisition of control at the same price
as the control transaction should be presumed fair, absent a showing
132 The widespread employment of "shark repellent" charter amendments that
assure minority public shareholders that they will receive at least as much as the ten-
dering majority of shareholders received is evidence of a willingness to accept the same
price the majority found attractive. William J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs,
Shark Repellents and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B.
FOUND. REs.J. 341, 373-82 (1983) ("[Fair price rules] are designed to assure nonten-
dering shareholders a 'fair' price in the event of a takeout merger.").
13 John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Sci-
entific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REv. 271, 359-65 app. C (2000), cites fifteen separate event
studies of these amendments, some of which examine as many as 763 amendments.
Because of potential overlap in these studies, it is impossible to determine the total
number of adopting firms without examining the database for each study. For a de-
scription of the varieties of shark repellent amendments, see Carney, supra note 132, at
373-82; see generally William J. Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers and Shark Repellents, 4
MIDLAND CORP. FIN.J. 48 (1986).
134 Carney, supra note 102, at 51; Carney, supa note 132, at 373-82.
1s5 Carney, supra note 102, at 51-52; Carney, supra note 132, at 380. For an exam-
ple of such an amendment see WILLIAM J. CARaNEY, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS app. B (2000).
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that the shareholders who tendered in the first step were deceived.
This would parallel the treatment given in other contexts, such as the
Delaware Supreme Court's presumption of a fair price if a merger is
conditioned on approval by a majority of the informed public minor-
ity shareholders.' 6
The absence of a successful takeover bid during a freeze-out of
minority shareholders by a long-term majority shareholder raises a dif-
ferent issue. In this situation, there is no evidence of any probability
of a takeover bid that would create a control premium. Indeed, the
majority shareholder would not require ownership of all stock in or-
der to obtain a control premium; it could simply sell its existing
shares. What remains, then, is a suspicion that a majority shareholder
may find a freeze-out is to its benefit because it creates, in a sense, in-
visible wealth transfers from the minority. This is a slim reed on
which to build a conclusion that "intrinsic" values will always be in ex-
cess of market prices.
IV. THE FORGOTTEN STATUTE: INTERPRETATIVE CONFLICTS
We now move to a discussion of why the Delaware Supreme
Court's stance conflicts with the appraisal statute and other aspects of
Delaware law. Regardless of whether one accepts the previous argu-
ments made in this Article, these conflicts must be addressed and are
not easily resolved absent a rejection of the general use of control
premiums in appraisal proceedings.
A. Excluding the Gains from the Transaction: Warnings About Speculation
Delaware's appraisal statute, section 262(h), commands the court
to determine the fair value of "shares ... exclusive of any element of
value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger
or consolidation .... This rule implicitly recognizes that by exiting
the firm, the shareholder is not bearing the risks of the merged firm
and should not share in the anticipated rewards from its success.138
1 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) ("[W]here corpo-
rate action has been approved by an informed vote of a majority of the minority share-
holders, we conclude that the burden entirely shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
transaction was unfair to the minority.").
137 DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2001).
138 Additionally, this rule is efficient in terms of providing the risk-takers who pur-
chase control with the marginal gains from the transaction. For a further discussion of
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In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court may have
narrowed the scope of the statutory language by holding that "[o] nly
the speculative elements of value that may arise from the 'accom-
plishment or expectation' of the merger are excluded."' 9 The courts
thereafter have focused on the term "speculative" rather than the
phrase "merger or consolidation" in determining what aspects of
value to exclude.14 Regardless of whether one agrees with this aspect
of the Weinberger decision, it is clear that the courts may not make
speculative determinations of value. Also, Delaware courts generally
have been careful to distinguish between values created by the an-
nounced merger and the value of the pre-merger firm. This is true
even where a new controlling shareholder has begun to implement
value-creating strategies in anticipation of total ownership after the
141
merger.
Application of a control premium in freeze-outs involves specula-
tion about aspects of value that might be created by a hypothetical
merger. In such cases, the parties and benefits of the hypothetical
merger are not known and, therefore, cannot be directly analyzed.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to square the use of control
premiums with the cautionary language of the appraisal statute and its
interpretation by Weinberger and other decisions. The message of both
of these authorities militates against such a device. Indeed, the best
evidence that no control premiums are currently unrecognized in the
stock's price is the fact that no transfer of control is taking place in the
class of freeze-out mergers that we address here.
B. The Stock Market Exception
Awarding a control premium in an appraisal proceeding unjusti-
fiably treats cash and stock mergers differently in terms of value re-
ceived. Like many other states, Delaware provides an exception from
appraisal rights where the consideration given to the minority share-
holders is stock in another publicly held corporation. Under these
efficiency gains under the Delaware statute, see Hermalin & Schwartz, supra note 107,
at 355.
139 457 A.2d at 713.
140 See, e.g., Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 550 (Del. 2000) (holding
that speculative tax liabilities and expenses should be excluded from net asset value);
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 297 (Del. 1996) (citing Weinberger, 457
A.2d at 713, for the rule that only "speculative elements of value" may be disregarded).
141 See, e.g., Cede, 684 A.2d at 298-99 (holding that value added prior to a cash-out is
still attributable to the going concern).
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circumstances, shareholders who do not like the deal can follow Bay-
less Manning's advice and simply sell their shares into the market.
1 42
If, as the Delaware courts now believe, the market price of all compa-
nies reflects a minority discount, then the minority shareholders who
sold into the market would receive less than the full value of their
shares.
143
Manning argued that appraisal was unnecessary to protect minor-
ity shareholders in mergers. In his view, the expense and delay of the
remedy were so great that the net proceeds to shareholders were un-
likely to exceed what could be obtained by selling into the market.
T4
Manning's radical idea was taken up with remarkably little debate or
discussion. Indeed, Professor Ernest Folk's recommendations to the
Delaware Corporation Law Revision Committee adopted Manning's
proposals without attribution, 145 and they were adopted in the 1967
revision of the Delaware General Corporation Law. 4 6 The Model Act
followed suit in 1969, although the Committee on Corporate Laws re-
versed direction in 1978, when it apparently felt that generally "de-
pressed stock prices did not provide frozen-out shareholders with a
"fair" price. 47 Section 61 of the General Corporation Law of Dela-
ware's Revised Code of 1935 (Chapter 65) provided that upon merger
142 See Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223, 238 (1962) ("[I]n the remote event that [the shareholder] has
thought about the transaction and reacted against it, he simply sells his shares.").
Because the stock price will decline on news of a merger that is disadvanta-
geous for public shareholders, this provides essentially no protection for public share-
holders who receive shares in another publicly held corporation. For works noting this
observation, see Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 875, 885; Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3
DEL. L. REV. 1, 21 (2000); Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Ap-
praisal'sRole in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 29 (1995).
144 Manning, supra note 142, at 260-62.
145 ERNEST L. FOLK III, REVIEW OF THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 198-200
(1968).
146 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2001) (originally enacted as § 262(k)). Pro-
fessor Folk's post-adoption commentary is equally succinct, asserting that "if the ap-
praisal remedy provides a judicially created market for dissenting stockholders, such a
device is unnecessary where there is already a substantial trading market .. " ERNEST
L. FOLK III, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY AND
ANALYSIS 391 n.152 (1972). This account is somewhat of a simplification. For a more
detailed account, see Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL.
L. REV. 1, 7-9 (2000), which describes the 1967 Folk revisions and the market-out ex-
ception.
147 Alfred F. Conard, Amendments of Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissent-
ers'Rights (Sections 73, 74, 80 and 81), 33 Bus. LAW. 2587, 2595 (1978). This was an er-
ror, because minority shareholders frozen out in depressed markets could replace
their shares with stocks priced at similarly depressed levels.
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and written demand, dissenting shareholders shall be paid the value
of their stock at the date of merger. It is hardly surprising that in its
initial decisions in this area, the Delaware Supreme Court did not
consider the issues of control premiums or minority discounts. In
1950, the year in which Ti-Continental Corp. v. Battye'49 was decided,
the control premium phenomenon, in the context of sales of control,
was barely on the horizon (although it would generate much discus-
sion in the following two decades). 5  In Tri-Continental, the court's
statement that shareholders should be paid the value of their stock
simply meant that they were not entitled to a valuation based upon
their pro rata share of the value of the underlying firm assets as if liq-
uidation occurred. The issue of whether shares could have different
values under different circumstances never arose, except to reject the
use of liquidation values.
The market exception approach, adopted in 1967, did not appear
to change radically what dissenting shareholders would obtain. It
simply made it clear that dissenting shareholders would receive the
market value obtainable at the time of sale, and no more-an amount
not noticeably different from the "value of their stock on the date of
148 DEL. REv. CODE § 2093 (1935).
149 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950).
150 See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955) ("[I]n a time of
market shortage, where a call on a corporation's product commands an unusually
large [control] premium ... we think it sound law that a fiduciary may not appropriate
to himself the value of this premium."); William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to
Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505, 506 (1965) (asserting that
whenever a controlling block of shares is sold, minority shareholders should receive an
equal opportunity to sell their shares under equivalent terms); David C. Bayne, A Phi-
losophy of Corporate Control 112 U. PA. L. REV. 22, 67 (1963) ("Corporate control is truly
a corporate asset. All shareholders are entitled to share equally in this asset. No indi-
vidual or group... may lawfully appropriate this asset solely for personal benefit.");
Robert W. Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions: Where We Stand Today, 36 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 248, 250 (1985) (examining academic writing between 1930 and 1970
which asserted that "'control' is a corporate asset" and that all shareholders should
share the premium proportionately); Richard W. Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control
44 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1956) (arguing that a controlling shareholder should relinquish any
premium from the sale of the control block).
151 See Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 140-42 (Del. 1980) (applying the
rule established in Ti-Continental). It is strange to speak of asset values as somehow
separate from firm values, when financial assets, such as timber, only represent value
based upon the discounted value of the cash flows they will produce, but this is how
the Delaware courts have chosen to speak of them. This view arises because of Ti-
Continental's holding that firms are to be valued on the basis of their going concern
value before the merger announcement, rather than on their liquidation value. Id. at
141-42.
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the merger.'5 2 Those shareholders that did not dissent and that re-
ceived shares in another publicly traded entity would thus be treated
quite differently. It is puzzling that no Delaware court has ever noted
this remarkably disparate treatment.
C. Section 155 and "Fair Value"
We note one additional conflict in Delaware corporate law rele-
vant to this discussion. Section 155 of the Delaware Corporations
Code governs the issuance and disposition of fractional shares and
provides that "[a] corporation may, but shall not be required to, issue
fractions of a share. If it does not issue fractions of a share, it shall...
pay in cash the fair value of fractions of a share as of the time when
those entitled to receive such fractions are determined ....
In a recent reverse stock split to eliminate small holdings, Avaya,
Inc. proposed to pay holders of fractional shares the average market
price of their shares over the ten-day period preceding the transac-
tion.154 In approving the proposal as fair, ChiefJustice Veasey stated:
The corporation owes its cashed-out stockholders payment representing
the "fair value" of their fractional interests. The cashed-out stockholders
will receive fair value if Avaya compensates them with payment based on
the price of Avaya stock averaged over a ten-day period preceding the
Proposed Transaction. While market price is not employed in all valua-
tion contexts, our jurisprudence recognizes that in many circumstances
a property interest is best valued by the amount a buyer will pay for it.
The Vice Chancellor correctly concluded that a well-informed, liquid
trading market will provide a measure of fair value superior to any esti-
mate the court could impose.155
152 We note that this approach antedated widespread understanding of ECMH, so
it is unlikely that Manning, Folk, or the drafters of the Delaware Act and the Model Act
recognized that an announcement of a bad deal for public shareholders would imme-
diately depress the market price of their shares.
153 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 155 (2001) (emphasis added). In the alternative, the
corporation may either "arrange" for the disposition of fractional shares (by, for ex-
ample, acting as an intermediary to package the fractional interests into marketable
shares) or issue scrip or warrants that are redeemable when totaling a full share. Id.
154 Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880, 884 (Del. 2002). Under the proposal,
not all fractional shares would be cashed out; Avaya would immediately thereafter en-
gage in a mirror-image stock split. That is, after a 1-for-30 reverse stock split the com-
pany would transact in a 30-for-I stock split, in which all shareholders holding a whole
share or more would participate. Id. at 883. Those shareholders who lacked the
minimum number of shares would then be cashed out. Id. at 883-84.
155 Id. at 889-90 (footnotes omitted).
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APPRAISING THE NONEXISTENT
The Avaya opinion distinguished its use of market value as the ex-
clusive basis for determining fair value in a fractional shares case un-
der section 155 from the same exercise in appraisal cases, on the basis
that the appraisal statute instructs that "[i]n determining such fair
value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.", 56 We
simply observe that in an efficient market, absent information about
some market failure, market price is the only relevant factor.1 57 The
result is that under section 155, "fair value" means "market value" and
under section 262, "fair value" cannot mean "market value." This re-
sult is true even if that market value is based on a "well-informed, liq-
uid trading market [that] will provide a measure of fair value superior
,,158to any estimate the court could impose.
Probably the most interesting issue that the Avaya decision raises
is the distinction in procedure that the court has created between a
reverse stock split to eliminate small holdings and the use of a freeze-
out merger to accomplish the same end. Such a distinction is not
supported by the statutory language and may have unintended effects.
Future majority shareholders may be well advised to choose the re-
verse stock split as the most efficient method of eliminating minority
shareholders. If they so choose, then the control premium problem
of appraisal will become moot, since all freeze-outs will be structured
as reverse stock splits. A more consistent jurisprudence would aban-
don formalistic distinctions and make both freeze-out methods avail-
able by relying on market values, unless plaintiffs could establish to
the courts' satisfaction that market values were unreliable in a particu-
lar instance, and demonstrate the direction and magnitude of the er-
ror.
CONCLUSION
Modern financial theory has provided many insights into value,
including ECMH and portfolio theory. These models do not support
the current use of control premiums in appraisal proceedings. Since
the Delaware courts are entrusted to determine the "fair value" of a
dissenter's shares, the Delaware courts should bring clear considera-
tion of current financial knowledge to the appraisal process. Even if
this knowledge is set aside, confused, or simply rejected, so that one
156 DEL. CODE AINN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2001), cited in Avaya, 812 A.2d at 889 n.28.
157 We assume that Delaware's "independent legal significance" doctrine will con-
tinue to be applicable.
158 812 A.2d at 890.
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assumes that minority discounts are generally reflected in market
prices, a shareholder is fairly compensated when paid such a dis-
counted value because the shareholder can easily replace such a dis-
counted stock with another equally discounted stock. Furthermore,
when the current use of control premiums is highlighted against the
backdrop of the structure and language of the Delaware appraisal
statute and other aspects of Delaware corporate law, a tension is cre-
ated that is not easily rectified absent rejection of control premiums.
We suggest that the Delaware Supreme Court rethink its position on
control premiums so that dissenting shareholders are fairly compen-
sated without unnecessarily transferring value from the majority or
creating statutory conflicts.
